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ABSTRACT
In many dynamic open systems, agents have to interact with
one another to achieve their goals. Here, agents may be
self-interested, and when trusted to perform an action for
others, may betray that trust by not performing the actions
as required. In addition, due to the size of such systems,
agents will often interact with other agents with which they
have little or no past experience. This situation has led to
the development of a number of trust and reputation mod-
els, which aim to facilitate an agent’s decision making in
the face of uncertainty regarding the behaviour of its peers.
However, these multifarious models employ a variety of dif-
ferent representations of trust between agents, and measure
performance in many diﬀerent ways. This has made it hard
to adequately evaluate the relative properties of diﬀerent
models, raising the need for a common platform on which
to compare competing mechanisms. To this end, the ART
Testbed Competition has been proposed, in which agents
using diﬀerent trust models compete against each other to
provide services in an open marketplace. In this paper, we
present the winning strategy for this competition in 2006,
provide an analysis of the factors that led to this success, and
discuss lessons learnt from the competition about issues of
trust in multiagent systems in general. Our strategy, IAM, is
Intelligent (using statistical models for opponent modelling),
Abstemious (spending its money parsimoniously based on its
trust model) and Moral (providing fair and honest feedback
to those that request it).
1. INTRODUCTION
Trust constitutes an important facet of multiagent systems
research since it provides a form of distributed social con-
trol within highly dynamic and open systems whereby agents
form opinions about other agents based on their past interac-
tions, as well as from reports of other agents [8]. As a result,
a number of trust models and strategies have been proposed
in order to deal with distinct aspects of the interactions be-
tween agents (e.g. to deal with lying agents [1], to model
and learn the behaviour of other agents [10, 9] and to fuse
information from disparate sources and models [5]). This,
in turn, has rendered it hard to compare trust strategies
since the underlying problem addressed by these strategies
has been diﬀerent. Therefore, in order to provide a common
platform on which “researchers can compare their technolo-
gies against objective metrics” the Agent Reputation and
Trust (ART) Testbed Competition has been proposed [3].
The ART Testbed simulates an environment consisting of
service providers that compete in order to provide informa-
tion services. There is a ﬁxed total number of clients who are
apportioned between the service providers according to the
comparative quality of their service provision. Each of these
information providers needs to spend money in order to gain
information. Furthermore, they can improve their quality of
service by requesting (against a payment) the other agents
for information. However, it is not necessary that the re-
quested agents will provide good information. In fact, as
a result of the competition between the agents, it is quite
likely that the agents will provide bad information. Thus,
within this competition, trust and reputation become impor-
tant metrics with which to measure the reliability of other
agents. This is because trust and reputation measure the
certainty with which each of the other agents provides good
opinions and reputation information.
In this paper, we describe the winning strategy, IAM (our
research group name), of the 2006 competition. The ART
testbed competition received 17 entries and our entry proved
to be highly successful, beating its closest competitor in the
ﬁnal by approximately 28%. The aim of this paper, there-
fore, is to describe the various facets of the strategy which
contributed to the eﬀectiveness of the IAM agent.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we analyse
the decision problems faced by a generic agent within the
competition. We then go on to describe the two main com-ponents of the IAM agent, namely its trust model and its
strategy. In Section 3, we describe how the IAM agent fuses
information from the disparate sources within the compe-
tition for the purposes of its trust model. Section 4 then
details the spending and earning strategy of the IAM agent
according to the trust model. Finally, we discuss the strat-
egy and the competition in Section 5 and conclude in Sec-
tion 6.
2. DESIGNINGACOMPETITIONENTRANT
In this section, we ﬁrst provide a brief description of the
ART testbed competition. We then analyse the general
problem faced by an agent within the competition which
gives rise to the broad outlines of the design of a generic
agent.
2.1 Competition Overview
The ART competition consists of a number of art apprais-
ing agents that provide appraisals about the value of the art
objects of their clients, who pay them to do so. A game,
within this competition, consists of a predetermined (but
unknown to the agents) number of iterations. At the begin-
ning of each game, each agent is assigned a privately known
expertise vector that determines the variance of its error
in appraising a painting when spending a certain amount of
money. The vector is over the ten eras from which the paint-
ings can come. The higher the expertise of the agent, the
lower the variance of its error in assessing the painting’s true
value. The agent can then spend a certain amount of money
gathering opinions from other agents about the paintings it
has been tasked with appraising. Since the other agents
can provide spurious opinions, the agent also needs to build
a trust model to reﬂect its belief of how other agents will
act when providing opinions. In order to aid it to build
this trust model, the agent can also buy reputation informa-
tion from other agents, but again this is open to dishonest
behaviour on the part of the reputation provider. Having
decided which set of agents it will buy the opinions from,
the agent then provides the game simulator with weights
that determine how the diﬀerent opinions are fused in or-
der to provide the ﬁnal appraisals of the paintings. This
then completes one iteration of the game. The accuracy of
this appraisal as compared with that of the other competing
agents then determines the client share of the next iteration
i.e. the number of clients each agent obtains in the next
round. Thus, in each round, the agent makes money from
providing appraisal to its clients and spends money in en-
suring that the appraisal of the art objects are as accurate
as possible. The winner of the competition is the agent with
the highest bank balance at the end of the game. A much
more detailed description of the competition can be obtained
in [3] or at http://www.lips.utexas.edu/art-testbed/.
2.2 The Agent Decision Model
We now describe the decision problem faced by a generic
agent at a given round in a game, which can be represented
as shown in Figure 1. Note that this model is part of our
analysis of the problem in which we are identifying the main
functional blocks that competition agents would need to a
more or less sophisticated degree. Though they may not
implement the model in this way, they still require to have
all this functionality in whatever architecture they do have.
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Figure 1: Agent design for the ART game
As such, it can be observed that in order to be a successful
agent within the ART Testbed Competition, there are two
main issues to consider. Firstly, we need to consider how
to model the performance (i.e. accuracy) of each opinion
provider in order to use their opinions accordingly. This is
shown by the trust model component in Figure 1. Secondly,
we need to formulate the strategy of the agent which will
in turn regulate how its spends and earns money as well as
how it provides information to its competitors. The exper-
tise of the agent is a variable ﬁxed by the simulator at the
beginning of the game. As a result, an agent knows about
its own variances in generating opinions and this will in turn
inﬂuence the strategy of the agent. We now describe these
two main parts of a generic agent design.
The ﬁrst part is concerned with the trust model which itself
consists of three main parts: (i) the lying detector which
detects malicious agents, (ii) the variance estimator which
estimates how much variance there is in the error of the opin-
ions of other agents (i.e. their performance), and (iii) the op-
timal weight calculator which provides the optimal weights
to provide to the simulator. These weights determine how
the opinions an agent requested from its competitors are
fused with its own opinion to generate the ﬁnal appraisal
and thereby its client share in the next iteration.
Now a large part of the quality of the trust model will rest
on the reliability of the information the agent has gathered.
The agent receives two main types of information. Firstly,
it receives opinions about the paintings from its competi-
tors (by requesting and paying for them) and it can receive
opinions from the simulator by spending a certain amount
of money. Secondly, it can obtain information about the
behaviour of other agents, termed reputation information,
by paying its competitors. Now, the quality of informa-
tion obtained from the various sources is dependent on theamount of money the agent spends on these various informa-
tion providers as well as the behaviour of these sources. The
provision of this information is what the strategy component
of the agent determines.
An agent can spend money on requesting opinions and rep-
utation information from its competitors, as well as generat-
ing its own opinion. Furthermore, an agent can make money
by providing opinions and reputation information, as well as
by providing appraisals to its client base. Thus, a successful
agent needs to formulate a strategy that prudently spends
money on obtaining opinions and information whilst ascer-
taining that its overall appraisal of the art painting of its
client is comparatively good. Furthermore, the strategy de-
termines how it interacts with its requesters when requested
for opinions and reputation information.
Having brieﬂy described the ART competition and how to
construct a generic competition agent for it, we now describe
the speciﬁc components of the IAM strategy. We will ﬁrst
describe the trust model component of IAM in the next sec-
tion and then go on to detail its strategy in the subsequent
section.
3. THE IAM AGENT’S TRUST MODEL
In this section, we show how, by combining its own opinion
with those of others, the IAM agent can generate an overall
appraisal of a painting that is more reliable than any single
opinion on which it is based. That is, for a given painting
with true value v, we wish to derive a combined estimate,
e, which is a function of the agent’s own estimate, e0, and
the reported third party estimates {e1,...,eq}. Moreover,
our aim is to perform this combination such that the mean
squared error, E[(e−v)
2], is smaller than that of each indi-
vidual appraisal in {e0,...,eq}. Thus, by reporting e dur-
ing the competition, the IAM agent can increase its market
share, due to the increased accuracy of its appraisals, and
hence increase its revenue.
How this can best be achieved depends on the reliability of
each agent’s individual appraisals per era and, more specif-
ically, on the variance, var(ei), of each estimate, ei. Al-
though, in the competition, each agent knows the variances
of its own private appraisals, agents are not obliged to reveal
these variances, nor are they obliged to reveal their private
appraisals truthfully.
For these reasons, we must estimate the variances associ-
ated with each agent, and consequently adopt a three-step
approach to combining appraisals. First, under the assump-
tion that an agent reveals its appraisals truthfully, we use a
Bayesian analysis to estimate an agent’s variance, by mod-
elling the factors which determine an agent’s opinions. Sec-
ond, we calculate a lower bound on the probability that an
agent is lying about its appraisals, and use this to discard the
opinions of potentially malicious agents. Finally, based on
the estimated variances of agents believed to be truthful, we
derive the optimal method for combining appraisals, under
the constraints imposed by the competition. In the following
subsections, we examine each of these steps in more detail.
3.1 Calculating Optimal Weights
The problem of combining estimates of an unknown value is
one that has received much attention in the literature, for
example [4] and [6]. In general, however, it can be viewed as
an optimisation problem, in which we need to ﬁnd a function
e = f(e0,...,eq) of several estimates, {e0,...,eq}, such that
e has minimal mean squared error (MSE).
In many cases, the optimal function for achieving this is non-
linear. However, one of the restrictions imposed by the com-
petition is that estimates must be combined by the testbed,
on an agent’s behalf. This is achieved according to Equa-
tion 1, in which {w0,...,w1} are weights applied to the
individual opinions, which an agent can specify:
e =
q X
i=0
wi · ei (1)
Clearly, this function is linear, which constrains our search
for an optimal combination. Moreover, optimality results
for functions of this form are well known, and are gener-
ally referred to as Best Linear Unbiased Estimates (BLUE)
[7]. Here, by unbiased we mean that the expected value
of the combined estimate is equal to the value being esti-
mated, or equivalently in this case, E[e] = v. According
to the design of the competition, the private appraisals of
each agent are themselves unbiased estimates of v, which, al-
though not essential, does simplify the problem of deriving
a BLUE. Speciﬁcally, if we assume for the moment that pri-
vate appraisals are truthfully revealed and that each var(ei)
is known, a BLUE combination of appraisals can be achieved
by setting each wi as follows:
wi =
1/var(ei) Pq
i=0 1/var(ei)
(2)
Unfortunately, the variance of each ei is unknown during
the competition, and so the optimal weights must be es-
timated, given an agent’s past experience and knowledge
of the environment. However, this task is simpliﬁed because
each wi only depends on the relative proportions of the vari-
ances. That is, if we multiply or divide each variance by an
arbitrary constant then the weights remain unchanged, for
example:
wi =
c/var(ei) Pq
i=0 c/var(ei)
(3)
wi =
c/var(ei)
c
Pq
i=0 1/var(ei)
(4)
wi =
1/var(ei) Pq
i=0 1/var(ei)
(5)
This has important implications for our strategy, when we
consider how variances are assigned in the competition. Specif-
ically, the variance of each agent’s private opinion, for a
given era, is generated by the testbed according to Equa-
tion 6, where si is the component of the ith agent’s exper-
tise vector specifying its knowledge of the painting’s era, Ci
is the amount of money spent by the ith agent to generate
the appraisal, and α is a constant shared by all agents that
during the competition was set to 0.5:
var(ei) = v
2
„
si +
α
Ci
«2
(6)Although, in general, si and Ci are unknown, the value of v
2
is constant for all i, and so is irrelevant. Therefore, rather
than estimate var(ei) directly, it is suﬃcient to estimate
the value of var(ei/v), which from the general properties of
random variables is equal to:
var(ei/v) =
„
si +
α
Ci
«2
(7)
This is a much easier problem because we know that var(ei/v)
will remain the same, even if v changes. In the following
section we show how, using this fact, an agent can estimate
var(ei/v) and so choose appropriate weights for each ap-
praisal it receives.
3.2 Estimating Truthful Variances
From the previous section, we know that, for i > 0, var(ei/v)
depends on two unknown parameters, si and Ci, and conse-
quently must be estimated. One well founded way to achieve
this is to use Bayesian analysis to marginalise over the un-
known parameters [2]. That is, given si and Ci we know
that var(ei/v) is equivalent to Equation 7, and from this,
we can then calculate the marginal variance, E[var(ei/v)],
as follows:
E[var(ei/v)] =
X
si∈S
X
Ci∈C
P(si,Ci)
„
si +
α
Ci
«2
(8)
Here, P(si,Ci) is the joint probability of the unknown pa-
rameters, S & C are their respective domains, and based on
this, optimal weights can be estimated using:
wi =
1/E[var(ei/v)] Pq
j=0 1/E[var(ei/v)]
(9)
In the case of an agent’s own variance, the values of s0 and
C0 are known, and so E[var(e0/v)] simpliﬁes to var(e0/v).
For third party opinions, on the other hand, we must model
the probability distribution of si and Ci, based on available
evidence. To this end, we assume that domains S and C
are deﬁned as follows, based on an analysis of the testbed
software and competition rules:
S = {0.1,0.2,...,1} (10)
C = {1,2,...,10} (11)
This means that we can record P(si,Ci) using a 10x10 con-
ditional probability table (CPT) which we can update in
light of an agent’s experiences, and we can use this to cal-
culate E[var(ei/v)]. For example, in absence of evidence to
the contrary, we may assume that all possible values of si
and Ci are equally likely, resulting in the CPT shown in Ta-
ble 1. Substituting the appropriate entries into Equation 9,
this gives us a marginal variance of 0.5848. Moreover, if we
hold the same beliefs for all agents then wi = 1/q for each
i:
wi =
1/E[var(ei/v)] Pq
j=0 1/E[var(ei/v)]
=
1/0.5848 Pq
j=0 1/0.5848
(12)
=
1/0.5848
q/0.5848
=
1
q
(13)
Over time, the entries in the CPT are updated to reﬂect
both an agent’s experiences with diﬀerent appraisers, and
si
Ci 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
3 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
4 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
5 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
6 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
7 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
8 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
9 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Table 1: Joint CPT for Ci and si and its initial values
the possibility that an agent may change its strategy be-
tween episodes. This is achieved by performing two opera-
tions at the end of each timestep: (1) update the CPT in
light of any received opinions, and (2) add time dependent
noise to account for dynamic behaviour.
To deﬁne these steps, we must ﬁrst specify how we model
dynamic behaviour in truth telling opinion providers. We
know from the competition rules that si does not change
for the duration of a game, but Ci can change if the opinion
provider changes its policy. To account for this, we deﬁne C
t
i
as the value of Ci at time t ∈ Z
+. For each possible value
of Ci, we then deﬁne transition probabilities that specify
the conditional probability P(C
t+1
i = c1|C
t
i = c0) where c1
and c0 belong to C. For example, we may deﬁne transition
probabilities such that:
p(C
t+1
i = c1|C
t
i = c0) =
 9
10 if c0 = c1
1
90 otherwise (14)
thus assigning a probability of 0.1 to a provider changing
Ci on any given time step, with equal probability of that
transition being to any other possible state.
With this in mind, we can now consider the CPT update
rules. First, if by the end of a time step we know that the
true value of a painting is v
t, and that the opinion provided
by an opinion provider is e
t
i, then we perform step 1 by
calculating the posterior CPT using Bayes rule as follows:
P
`
si,C
t
i
˛
˛p
t
i
´
=
P
`
p
t
i
˛
˛si,C
t
i
´
P
`
si,C
t
i
´
P
s∈S
P
c∈C P (pt
i|s,c)P (s,c)
(15)
Here, p
t
i is deﬁned as e
t
i/v
t; P(s,C
t
i) is the prior proba-
bility of the parameters, taken from the current CPT; and
P(p
t
i|s,C
t
i) is the data likelihood function. The latter is
determined by the competition testbed, which generates es-
timates from a Gaussian distribution with mean v
t and vari-
ance var(e
t
i). By substituting into the Gaussian p.d.f., we
thus have:
p(p
t
i|si,C
t
i) =
1
p
2π(si + α/Ct
i)2 exp
»
−
(p
t
i − 1)
2
2(si + α/Ct
i)2
–
(16)
Finally, in step 2, we prepare the ground for the next time
step by marginalising over C
t
i using the transition probabil-
ities. This is achieved by updating the CPT for timestept + 1, as follows:
P(si,C
t+1
i ) =
X
Ct
i∈C
P(C
t+1
i ,si,C
t
i) (17)
=
X
Ct
i∈C
P(C
t+1
i |si,C
t
i)P(si,C
t
i) (18)
which, assuming we do not specify diﬀerent transition prob-
abilities depending on si, is equal to:
P(si,C
t+1
i ) =
X
Ct
i∈C
P(C
t+1
i |C
t
i)P(si,C
t
i) (19)
3.3 Dealing with Liars
So far, we have shown how optimal weights can be estimated
for agents that reveal their appraisals truthfully. However,
as this is not necessarily the case, we need to be able to
identify lying behaviour among agents, and act appropri-
ately. This serves two purposes: (1) it identiﬁes potentially
ﬁctitious appraisals, which are then eliminated from consid-
eration before the combined appraisals are calculated; and
(2) it informs the IAM agent’s spending strategy, and how
it behaves toward agents it believes to be malicious (see Sec-
tion 4).
To this end, we test the hypothesis that an agent’s last k
opinions are truthful, based on what we know about how an
agent’s private opinions are generated. Here, k can be set
to the total number of opinions received from an agent, or
it can be set to the number of opinions received in the last
n timesteps, to allow for the possibility that an agent may
change its strategy over time. More speciﬁcally, according
to our assumptions, the maximum mean squared error for a
truthful opinion is:
max[mse] = v
2
„
max[si] +
α
min[Ci]
«2
(20)
= v
2
„
1 +
0.5
0.1
«2
(21)
= 2.25v
2 (22)
On this basis, the random variable ei/v is normally dis-
tributed with mean 1 and variance 2.25. According to the
standard properties of normally distributed random vari-
ables, if the last k opinions are all generated in this way,
then the following statistic has a chi-squared distribution
with k degrees of freedom:
Qk =
1
2.25
k X
i=1
(ei/vi − 1)
2 (23)
This allows us to place an upper bound on the probability
that an agent’s last k opinions are truthful, by comparing
the actual value of Qk to the quantiles of the chi-squared
distribution.
For example, the distribution of Qk for k = 5 is shown in
Figure 2, in which the vertical lines mark the 0.75, 0.95 and
0.99 quantiles respectively. Now suppose that, as illustrated,
Qk is recorded as 18. As this occurs beyond the 0.99 quan-
tile, this means that, even if all k opinions were generated
with the highest possible variance for truthful opinions, the
probability of Qk occurring by chance is less than 0.01. In
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Figure 3: Cash ﬂows from/to the (IAM) agent
the next section, we show how, by making such compar-
isons, an agent can make appropriate decisions about how
to interact with its peers.
4. THE IAM AGENT’S STRATEGY
This section describes the strategy that the IAM agent adopts
in order to maximise its ﬁnal earnings (i.e. income less
spending) in the ART game. First, we need to look at the
cash ﬂows to and from our agent in order to identify where
decisions need to be made to optimise the agent’s spending
and earnings (see Figure 3). In brief, there are three sources
and three sinks of cash for an agent participating in the com-
petition. Figure 3 also depicts the magnitudes of these six
ﬂows of cash as decided by the competition. We will now
discuss each of these cash ﬂows in turn. We will denote with
+ those ﬂows that generate income for the agent and by −
those where the agent needs to spend.
1. Appraisal orders (+): At the beginning of each round
in the game, the simulator generates a number of or-
ders for each agent. The agent earns $100 per appraisal
order regardless of how it will fulﬁll that order (even
if it decides not to provide an appraisal). Since the
amount earned per order is ﬁxed, an agent can only
increase its earnings from this ﬂow by increasing its
number of orders in successive rounds. This can only
be achieved if it provides a better service than its com-
petitors (i.e. providing more accurate appraisals thanthose of its competitors). This in turn requires the
spending of money on 2, 3, and 4 below.
2. Generating own appraisals (−): The IAM agent can
spend an arbitrary amount of money (representing the
time cost associated with the appraising activity) to
generate its own opinion for a particular order. The
more money it spends, the more accurate the appraisal
will be. However, this accuracy is limited to a pre-
deﬁned value according to the agent’s expertise in a
particular art era. More mathematically, the standard
deviation of the error of the opinion generated by the
simulator, to which the appraiser with expertise si has
provided Ci is given by:
std(ei) =
p
var(ei) =
„
si +
α
Ci
«
v (24)
where α is a parameter set by the competition and v is
the true value of the painting. Thus, it can be observed
that deciding on the expenditure of money in generat-
ing one’s own opinion is not straightforward and this
will be investigated in greater detail in Section 4.1.
3. Opinion requests (−): An agent can also request the
opinion(s) of other agents on a particular appraisal or-
der. Each opinion request has a ﬁxed cost of $10. Note
that opinion providers (i.e. other agents in the game)
are not obliged to provide their opinions after hav-
ing received the money. In addition, they can provide
opinions of low accuracy either due to having very low
expertise on the concerned art era and/or deciding to
spend little money on generating their opinions. Thus,
the selection of opinion providers and the calculation
of the weights to be provided to the simulator in order
to aggregate opinions are challenging problems which
an agent faces when buying opinions. Section 4.2 dis-
cusses how the IAM agent tackles these problems.
4. Reputation requests (−): In order to help agents ﬁnd
out about good opinion providers, the ART testbed
allows agents to contact one another to ask for their
evaluation about the appraising performance of a par-
ticular agent in a particular era
1.
5. Providing opinions (+): An agent can also earn by
providing opinions to other agents (i.e. its competi-
tors) when requested. The earnings for such a service
are ﬁxed at $10 per opinion request. This service can
provide extra income to boost the IAM agent’s prof-
its and the strategy for this is speciﬁcally looked at in
Section 4.3.
6. Reputation service (+): Similarly to providing its opin-
ions, the IAM agent can also provide to other agents
the reputation value of a particular agent in the game
for $1 per reputation request.
1The performance of an agent in an art era is not neces-
sarily equivalent to its expertise in that era. The actual
performance of an agent is also determined by the amount
of money it decides to spend on generating appraisals for
others in addition to its expertise. For this reason, an agent
can provide diﬀerent levels of quality of service to diﬀerent
partners and, thus, the reputation values of the same agent
provided by diﬀerent partners can be diﬀerent (assuming
that the partners provide their honest evaluation as the rep-
utation values).
From the cash ﬂow analysis above, since providing the ap-
praisal service to customers earns relatively much more money
than providing opinions or reputation values, our strategy
focuses on maximising the customer base of the IAM agent
by trying to provide a highly accurate appraisal service.
However, the more accurate an agent wants its appraisals
to be, the more money it needs to spend (see the money
ﬂows 2, 3, and 4), and, as a result, the less proﬁt it makes
from a job. Meanwhile, spending less will result in less ac-
curate appraisals, and in the ART game, this means fewer
customers and thus less income. This is a classic tradeoﬀ
between proﬁt and customers. Therefore, it is important to
ﬁnd the balance between these; i.e. spend wisely to generate
accurate appraisals and to retain a high proﬁt at the same
time. In more detail, before a ﬁnal appraisal is produced
for a particular order, the IAM agent needs to make the
following decisions:
1. how much should it spend on generating its own ap-
praisal given its expertise on the art era of the order,
2. whether it needs to ask for external opinions for a given
order and, if so, which opinion providers it should
choose and
3. whether it needs to ask for the reputation values of
opinion providers and how these values can be used to
help it makes the decisions in (2).
Regarding using reputation values provided by other agents,
since the game rules do not specify the semantics of a rep-
utation value, except that it is a number in the range [0,1],
interpreting their real meanings is very diﬃcult (because
there is no commonly shared semantics). Moreover, given
the small number of participating agents in a game (5), the
behaviours of the other agents can be learnt fairly quickly
and thus reputation values are not of much use. For these
reasons, the IAM agent does not request reputation values
from other participants (and saves a small amount of money
by doing so). Thus, it relies solely on the variance estima-
tor (Section 3.2) to estimate the performance of an opinion
provider.
In the remainder of this section, Sections 4.1 and 4.2 will
address the ﬁrst two issues above. In addition, Section 4.3
looks at how the IAM agent can increase its earnings by
providing opinions and reputation values to other agents in
a game.
4.1 Generating its Own Appraisals
An agent’s own appraisal for a painting is generated by the
simulator from a Gaussian distribution whose mean is the
painting’s true value (v) and whose deviation is determined
by the agent’s expertise (si) and the money it spends (Ci)
as in Equation 24. Therefore, given that si is predetermined
by the simulator, an agent can only directly aﬀect the ac-
curacy of its appraisals by changing the amount of money
it is willing to spend to generate the appraisals (i.e. Ci).
However, since the painting’s true value v is factored out
when the accuracy of an appraisal is calculated [3], for the
sake of simplicity, it is equivalent to considering the standard0 5 10 15 20
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Figure 4: The cost vs. deviation trade oﬀ
deviation of an agent’s appraisals to be the following:
std(ei/v) =
p
var(ei/v) = si +
α
Ci
(25)
Although the more an agent spends, the less the deviation
and the more accurate its appraisals, from Equation 25, it
is clear that the lower bound of the deviation is si and it
might not be worth spending more money when std(ei/v)
is close enough to si. In this respect, Figure 4 shows the
values of std(ei/v) corresponding to diﬀerent amounts of
spending on Ci for diﬀerent values of si in {0.1,0.2,...,1.0}.
Coincidentally, all the deviation curves in Figure 4 level oﬀ
from spending of $4 upwards, despite the value of si. This
means, in any case, $4 is a balance point between spending
and the accuracy gained from it. Spending more than $4
only yields a very marginal decrease of the deviation (or a
marginal increase of appraisal accuracy). Given this, the
IAM agent only spends $4 for generating its own appraisals
in all situations (regardless of its expertise).
4.2 Ordering External Opinions
In this section, we consider, given a particular appraisal or-
der and having known our own expertise si in the order’s
art era, whether external opinion(s) should be sought and,
if so, from whom. From the ﬁndings in the previous sec-
tions, since it is relatively cheap ($4 compared to the order
fee of $100) to generate its own appraisals which are rea-
sonably close to its expertise, the IAM agent always uses
its own appraisals regardless of whether it needs external
opinions or not because this would provide a safety catch
should other agents decide to cheat by not providing their
opinions as agreed. Having estimated the performance of
each opinion provider (i.e. its variance, see Section 3.2),
the IAM agent can evaluate the beneﬁt of having an opin-
ion from a particular opinion provider to justify the decision
of requesting an opinion from it. In other words, the IAM
agent needs to calculate the expected variance of the ﬁnal
appraisal
2 resulting from combining its own appraisal with
that of the potential opinion provider. Given that in pro-
ducing the ﬁnal appraisals, the simulator combines all the
submitted appraisals as in Equation 1 and the weight for
each appraisal wi is deﬁned as in Equation 5, the variance
2The expected variance of the ﬁnal appraisal reﬂects the
expected accuracy of the appraisal.
of the combined appraisal is given by:
var(e) =
q X
i=0
w
2
i · var(ei) (26)
where q is the number of external opinions (ei) the IAM
agent receives and e0 is its own appraisal. Replacing wi
from Equation 5 gives:
var(e) =
q X
i=0
 
1/var(ei) Pq
j=0 1/var(ej)
!2
· var(ei) (27)
=
 
1 Pq
j=0 1/var(ej)
!2 q X
i=0
1/var(ei) (28)
=
1 Pq
j=0 1/var(ej)
(29)
Factoring out the painting’s value v from both sides of Equa-
tion 29 gives us:
var(e/v) =
1 Pq
i=0 1/var(ei/v)
(30)
Although we do not know var(ei/v) for other agents, we
can estimate it (as shown in Section 3.2), and thus we can
estimate var(e/v):
E[var(e/v)] =
1 Pq
i=0 1/E[var(ei/v)]
(31)
where E[var(e0/v)] = var(e0/v) = s0 + α/C0 (because we
know our own parameters) and E[var(ei/v)] can be calcu-
lated as in Equation 8 for other agents.
Knowing how to calculate the combined variance of opin-
ions, the IAM agent can start selecting agents it will ask
for opinions by performing the following four steps. First,
all other agents are sorted in ascending order, according to
their estimated variances in the art era of the order (i.e. best
performance ﬁrst). Second, the list of agents whose opinions
will be used is initialised to contain (only) the IAM agent
itself (because it always uses its own appraisal). Third, the
IAM agent then considers adding each of the agents into the
list according to their performance order by calculating the
expected combined variance of the ﬁnal appraisal assuming
that agent is in the list. Finally, if the new combined vari-
ance is just insigniﬁcantly improved (i.e. improvement is
less than 15%
3) then the selection process stops; otherwise,
that agent is put into the list and the process continues with
the next agent.
After the selection process is ﬁnished, the IAM agent sends
opinion requests to agents selected in the list. However,
since the variance estimator assumes that agents do not
cheat when providing their appraisals, this process does not
ﬁlter out cheating agents. Therefore, before the selection
process begins, all the other agents are evaluated based on
their previous interactions using the procedure as described
in Section 3.3 to calculate the probability that an agent has
cheated in the past. If the cheating probability is over 0.6,
then the opinion provider is classiﬁed as a potential cheater
and its opinions will not be taken into account in our agent’s
3This improvement threshold is hand-picked based on our
experiments.ﬁnal appraisal. However, it will still be asked for opinions in
order to conﬁrm whether it is actually cheating. If the cheat-
ing probability is over 0.95, the opinion provider is classiﬁed
as a cheater and no future interaction with it will be made.
Moreover, an agent is also classiﬁed as a cheater if it failed
to provide an appraisal after having conﬁrmed that it will
provide an opinion.
4.3 Earning from Being Honest
Beside earning money from appraising orders by the simula-
tor, the IAM agent’s strategy is to maximise its income via
providing opinions and reputation values. Its philosophy in
doing so is to provide an honest and reliable service to all
agents in order to maintain a good business relationship with
them, which hopefully results in a regular source of income.
Moreover, providing a low quality service or cheating other
agents might initiate retaliatory behaviours from them. This
will have a detrimental eﬀect on the IAM agent’s own ap-
praising business when it requires external opinions to fulﬁl
orders in whose art era it is not an expert. Although the
general strategy here is to provide a good service, the IAM
agent is not na¨ ıvely benign. Rather, it looks for reciprocity
from its partners (who are also its competitors). Therefore,
if a cheater is identiﬁed, the IAM agent will use a retaliatory
policy toward it. Following this general strategy, the IAM
agent’s strategies for the earning cash ﬂows 5 and 6 (i.e.
providing opinions and reputation values for other agents,
see Figure 3) are discussed next.
4.3.1 Providing opinions:
The IAM agent aims to develops its reputation as an honest
agent in order to earn (good) money from providing opinions
to others. Thus, it always provides honest certainty values
(taking into account the money it will spend) and honest
appraisals (i.e. spending the same amount of money it said it
would spend). In more detail, the IAM agent always spends
$4 to generate appraisals for others (the same amount it
would spend to generate appraisals for its own orders, see
Section 4.1). When requested for its certainty assessment on
its appraisals, the IAM agent will present the certainty value
(denoted by cv) based on its expertise in the art era of that
particular request and its intended spending to generate an
appraisal (i.e. Ci = $4):
cv = 1 −
(1 + α/Ci)si
1.5
(32)
where si is the expertise of the IAM agent in the concerned
art era and 1.5 is the maximum deviation of the Gaussian
distribution generating an agent’s appraisal value (given by
Equation 25 in the worst case scenario where the minimum
expertise si = 1.0 and the minimum spending Ci = $1).
In case it detects that an agent cheats by providing false
opinions to it or by taking the opinion fee without providing
an opinion, it will retaliate against the cheating agent in all
future opinion transactions by spending only a fractional
amount of money ($0.01) to generate appraisals that are
extremely skewed (due to the ensuing high deviation) for
the cheating agent.
4.3.2 Providing reputation values:
Agent Aﬃliation Revenue Cost Proﬁt
IAM University of
Southampton
149812 18299 131583
Neil Nanyang Techno-
logical University
116764 13741 103023
Frost Bogazici Univer-
sity
120753 18176 102577
Sabatini Universidad Car-
los III de Madrid
127137 25726 101411
Joey University of
Nebraska-Lincoln
111985 19506 92479
mean 125290 19076 106215
Table 2: Average revenue, proﬁt & cost at end of
ﬁnal round games
Agent Opinion
Costs
Opinion
Generation
Costs
Reputation
Costs
IAM 59.46 40.54 0.00
Neil 6.80 92.03 1.16
Frost 31.65 68.35 0.00
Sabatini 38.85 61.15 0.00
Joey 0.00 100.00 0.00
Table 3: Breakdown of cost percentages.
As previously mentioned, there is no deﬁned semantics for
reputation values except that their range is [0,1]. We there-
fore deﬁne the reputation value (ri) to provide based on the
estimated variance of an agent, which we believe best reﬂects
the performance of that agent as so far perceived:
ri = max{1 −
p
var(ei/v)
1.5
,0} (33)
where 1.5 is again the maximum deviation given the worst
case scenario and
p
var(ei/v) is the estimated deviation of
that agent’s appraisals. In this service, the IAM agent pro-
duces random reputation values in [0,1] for cheating agents.
5. COMPETITION RESULTS
In this section, we give an in depth discussion of the compe-
tition results, concentrating on its ﬁnal round in particular.
This consisted of 10 games with 60 time steps each, in which
the top 5 agents from a series of preliminary games were
pitted against each other (there were 17 agents entered into
the competition). At the end of each game, the total proﬁt
earned by each agent was recorded, and then averaged over
all 10 games to produce the ﬁnal scores. The results of this
process are shown in Table 2, which includes the average
revenue and cost for each agent over the 10 games. In par-
ticular, this shows that the IAM agent won the competition
by a 28% proﬁt margin over its nearest competitor, earning
the highest revenue of any agent, with below average costs.
A more detailed breakdown of each agent’s cash ﬂow is
shown in Tables 3 and 4, in terms of the types of payment
that contributed to the costs and revenue in the ﬁnal round
games. Here, client, opinion and reputation payments refer
to the total amount of each agent’s revenue that was due to
payments for client appraisals, opinion generation and repu-
tation respectively; opinion costs refer to the amount spentAgent Client
Pay-
ments
Opinion
Pay-
ments
Reputation
Payments
IAM 96.09 3.89 0.03
Neil 98.63 1.37 0.00
Frost 98.45 1.52 0.03
Sabatini 88.25 11.72 0.03
Joey 96.96 3.00 0.04
Table 4: Breakdown of revenue percentages.
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Figure 5: Opinion Spending
requesting third party opinions; opinion generation costs are
those spent on generating opinions for third parties; and rep-
utation costs are those spent requesting reputation about an
agent’s peers.
From these results, it is clear that largest proportion of each
agent’s revenue was due to payments for client appraisals,
followed by opinion payments and reputation in that order.
This is partially a consequence of the comparatively high
price of client appraisals ($100 compared to $10 for opinions
and $1 for reputation). However, even taking this into ac-
count, it is clear that very little reputation was exchanged
between any of the agents, reinforcing the idea that reputa-
tion is only useful in large populations with clear semantics.
On the other hand, opinion transactions did feature more
prominently in the ﬁnal rounds, and played an important
role in determining the order of the leader table. Although
this is not reﬂected directly in agent revenues, opinion costs
accounted for the majority of the overhead in the IAM agent’s
winning strategy. To understand the reason for this, sup-
pose that two agents can co-operate by spending a total of
$10 on their opinions to appraise a painting. Assuming that,
for both agents, si = 1, α = 0.5, and the diﬀerence between
their individual expenditure is y, then the best achievable
variance for the appraisal (relative to a painting value) is:
var(e/v) =
„
1
[1 + 1/(10 + y)]2 +
1
[1 + 1/(10 − y)]2
«−1
(34)
Based on this equation, the appraisal variance resulting
from diﬀerence values of y is plotted in Figure 5. This shows
that the lowest possible variance is achieved when y = 0
or, in other words, when the agents divide the $10 equally
between their respective opinions. This can easily be shown
to be true in general, and explains why it was beneﬁcial for
the IAM agent to spend signiﬁcantly on third party opinions,
Agent MSE of Opinions
Reported to IAM
No. Opin-
ions Sent to
IAM
Neil 6.20 439
Frost 142533.43 179
Sabatini 0.41 10601
Joey 1338173.81 270
Table 5: Total number of opinions received by the
IAM agent compared to average opinion MSE.
Agent Revenue Cost Proﬁt
IAM 150132 18879 131253
Neil 139870 13757 126113
Joey 133417 19506 113911
Sabatini 127814 46470 81344
Frost 120833 42381 78452
Table 6: Alternative scores based on recorded num-
ber of opinion transactions.
rather than investing solely in its own direct assessments.
On the other hand, agents such as Neil and Joey, who spent
little or no income on third party opinions, did make it to the
ﬁnal round. This is perhaps an indication that, if opinions
are not used wisely based on solid statistical models, then
the simple strategy of using only an agent’s direct experience
can produce better results.
Concentrating more speciﬁcally on the IAM agent’s perfor-
mance, its success in the competition can be further ex-
plained by three other factors. First, by spending $4 on
opinion generation, it managed to spend less per client on
opinion generation than any of the other four ﬁnalists, while
still maintaining close to minimal opinion errors. Second,
the IAM agent further reduced its costs by only buying
opinions from reliable agents. This is made apparent when
we compare the total number of opinions received by IAM
from the other competitors, compared to the MSE of their
reported opinions (Table 5). This shows a clear correlation,
with IAM relying heavily on Sabatini’s accurate opinions,
while mostly rejecting opinions from the other competitors,
who provided misleading opinions. Third, by estimating op-
timal weights for received opinions based on standard sta-
tistical theory, the IAM agent was able to achieve the lowest
MSE for its appraisals compared to the other ﬁnalists, and
so was awarded the highest overall client market share.
In addition, the IAM agent’s share of the opinion market
was second only to Sabatini. This is partially because the
IAM agent itself was the highest consumer of third party
opinions in terms of expenditure, most of which was spend
on Sabatini’s expertise. However, there does appear to be a
discrepancy in the competition data between the number of
opinions received by each agent, and the number of opinions
paid for. More speciﬁcally, all ﬁve ﬁnalists sent more opin-
ions than they were paid for, perhaps due to inadequate
checks for payment, before opinions where sent. Without
further investigation, it is unclear whether the cause of this
lies with the competition testbed, the agents themselves, or
some combination of both. Nevertheless, if funds had been
exchanged for all the opinion transactions that took place,then this would have had a dramatic eﬀect on the competi-
tion, and would have resulted in the alternative scores shown
in Table 6. What this shows is that both Frost and Saba-
tini were sent signiﬁcantly more opinions than they paid for
and, had they been expected to pay for all these opinions,
they would have been placed at the bottom of the leader
board. However, we emphasise that this does not suggest
that these alternative scores are correct, or that the oﬃcial
scores are inaccurate. This is particularly true if the ex-
tra opinions were unsolicited, because it would be unfair to
make agents pay for unwanted opinions. Even so, this does
reveal an interesting anomaly that is perhaps worth further
investigation.
6. CONCLUSIONS
From the design of our successful agent for the ART com-
petition, three lessons can be drawn that are applicable to
trust assessment within multi-agent systems in general.
The ﬁrst lesson concerns the conditions under which an
agent can beneﬁt by pooling information from other agents
about their shared environment. In the ART competition,
this aggregation of information occurs at two levels, namely
at appraising art objects and at evaluating the trustworthi-
ness of other agents. We ﬁrst consider the appraisal of art
objects. In this case, an agent can beneﬁt from third party
information, if it is easier to establish such information as
reliable, than it is to obtain equivalent veriﬁable informa-
tion directly. This lesson is especially true with regard to
art appraisal, due to the way in which the MSE of an agent’s
opinions is calculated. That is, beyond a certain point, only
marginal increases in accuracy can be achieved by spending
more money on the opinion of an individual agent (Sec-
tion 4.1). Thus, it is generally more economical for an agent
to purchase opinions from a number of third parties than it is
to invest heavily in its own opinion. The success of the IAM
agent can be partially attributed to this conclusion, when
we compare its performance to other agents, such as Joey,
who invested little or no income on third party opinions.
The second lesson is the counter of the ﬁrst, establishing
when it is not beneﬁcial to try pooling information. For
example, in the competition, there is little apparent advan-
tage to reputation sharing, as is reﬂected by the negligible
number of reputation transactions that occurred in the ﬁ-
nal rounds. This can be attributed to the small number of
agents that participated in each round (typically 5 agents),
each of which had suﬃcient opportunity and funds to inter-
act with all of their peers in every time-step. As a result,
participants could gain reliable ﬁrst-hand experience of their
peers, as easily as they could gather reputation. Further-
more, the semantics of reputation were not well deﬁned, in-
creasing the diﬃcultly of its interpretation and assessment.
For example, suppose that reputation from one agent con-
sists of estimated standard deviations for opinions, while for
another it consists of estimated variances. Both statistics
have the same range of values, [0,∞), and in both cases,
lower values indicate more reliable opinions. However, their
correct interpretation is still diﬀerent: a variance of 10 im-
plies a much more reliable opinion that one with a standard
deviation of 10. Thus, to assess the reliability of reputa-
tion, it would ﬁrst be necessary to learn the function used
to create it. However, this does not imply that reputation
sharing is worthless in general. Rather, the lesson learnt is
that reputation is most valuable in cases where direct experi-
ence is relatively more diﬃcult to acquire, and in which the
semantics are clearly deﬁned.
The ﬁnal lesson is that, even if third party opinions carry
useful information, this value is wasted if opinions are not
properly applied using well founded statistical techniques. Al-
though trust can be viewed as a sociological concept, and
inspiration for computational models of trust can be drawn
from multiple disciplines, the problem of combining esti-
mates of unknown variables (such as trustee behaviour) is
fundamentally a statistical one. Thus, any mechanism for
making predictions based on reputation that ignores statis-
tical theory, does so at its peril. This claim may partially
explain the relative success of agents, such as Joey and Neil,
that spent little or no income on third party opinions. By
their presence in the ﬁnal rounds, these agents suggest that,
unless appropriate statistical techniques are used (such as
those used by the IAM agent), it is perhaps better to ignore
reputation completely, in favour of a simpler solution.
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